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For over sixty years, lawyers and historians have discussed the credibility and repercussions of the 
Nuremberg Trial (1945–1946). This paper argues that the defendants’ procedural due process rights 
were partially protected at Nuremberg, although there were gross breaches of particular fundamental 
due process rights. The Nuremberg Trial at the International Military Tribunal was conducted by the 
four Allied Powers to try the upper echelon Nazi war criminals following the Second World War. The 
London Charter, drafted by the Allies, outlined the trial procedure to be adopted, and provided certain 
guarantees in attempt to secure a fair trial for the twenty-two defendants. This paper examines the 
history of fundamental due process rights (recognised in both continental Europe and common law 
jurisdictions) and analyses the extent to which these rights were breached at Nuremberg. This paper 
further argues that despite the defendants being afforded more rights than they could have expected 
given the circumstances, such breaches significantly compromised the integrity of the trial. 
 
Key words: Nuremberg trial; due process rights; International Military Tribunal; fair trial.   
 
 
I Introduction 
 
The Allied victors of the Second World War wrote the London Charter (the Charter) 
establishing the International Military Tribunal (IMT) to try the upper echelon Nazi 
leaders. The due process rights of the twenty-two Nazi defendants were partially 
protected at Nuremberg, although there were gross breaches of particular fundamental 
rights, which compromised the integrity of the trial. However, given the unique 
historical and political context of the trial and the limited practical alternatives 
available, the Nazi defendants were arguably afforded more due process rights than 
they could have expected. 
 
The defendants’ right to a public trial was upheld at Nuremberg. All of the defendants 
were represented by counsel, though they were deprived of the opportunity to 
represent themselves. The independence of the Tribunal can be criticised, though 
arguably this did not detract from its ability to remain impartial. The grossest 
breaches of due process rights lay, firstly, in the lack of adequate time and facilities to 
prepare and present a defence, and secondly, in the deprivation of the right of appeal. 
These and other fundamental due process rights will be discussed in the context of the 
main Nuremberg Trial at the IMT. 
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While the retrospective application of law at Nuremberg is repeatedly criticised by 
lawyers and historians, this issue will not be dealt with in this paper. The focus of this 
paper is on the less frequently discussed due process rights accorded to the Nazi 
defendants during the trial itself, and the extent to which these rights were breached. 
 
II Background to Nuremberg 
 
Following the end of World War II, the Allied Powers were faced with the decision of 
what to do with the captured German war criminals. Three courses were open to the 
Allies: release, summary execution, or trial.
1
 The Soviets were in favour of summary 
execution, an option that received initial support from Churchill.
2
 Opinion surveys 
carried out in Britain and the United States of America indicated that the majority of 
public opinion was in favour of execution without trial of the upper echelon Nazi 
leaders.
3
 Henry L Stimson, United States Secretary of War, advocated for a trial, 
stating that the “moral position” of the Allies would be thrown into question if they 
conformed to Nazi methods and carried out execution without the protection of law.
4
  
 
On 8 August 1945, the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union 
(Allies) signed the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis Powers (London Charter).
5
 Article 1 of the Charter 
established the IMT, which was to sit at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg, 
Germany. The Allies selected the defendants because each was the highest-ranking 
                                                        
1
 Matthew Lippman “Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later” in Guenael Mettraux (ed) Perspectives on 
the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 492 at 522; Charles Anthony Smith 
The Rise and Fall of War Crimes Trials from Charles I to Bush II (Cambridge University Press, New 
York City, 2012) at 85; Henry L Stimson “The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law” (1947) 25 Foreign 
Aff 179 at 179; Aaron Fichtelberg “Fair Trials and International Courts: A Critical Evaluation of the 
Nuremberg Legacy” (2009) 28 Crim Just Ethics 5 at 7; Michael R Marrus The Nuremberg War Crimes 
Trial 1945–46: A Documentary History (Bedford Books, Boston, 1997) at 242-243. 
2
 Otto Kranzbuhler “Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards” in Guenael Mettraux (ed) Perspectives on 
the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 433 at 444; Mark Aarons “Justice 
Betrayed: Post-1945 Responses to Genocide” in David A Blumenthal and Timothy LH McCormack 
(eds) The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance? (Koninklijke 
Brill, Leiden, 2008) 69 at 70. 
3
 Fichtelberg, above n 1, at 7; Marrus, above n 1, at 242; Gary Jonathan Bass Stay the Hand of 
Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2000) at 
199. 
4
 Marrus, above n 1, at 244; Stimson, above n 1; Lippman, above n 1, at 552. 
5
 Accessible via Yale Law School “The London Charter of the International Military Tribunal 1945” 
The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy <avalon.law.yale.edu/imt>. 
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individual in his area or department.
6
 One defendant committed suicide; another was 
considered not fit to stand trial, leaving twenty-two defendants to be tried.  
 
The Tribunal was made up of four members: one voting judge selected from each of 
the four Allied powers, and each with an alternate. Lord Justice Lawrence (United 
Kingdom) was the President of the Tribunal. Francis Biddle (United States), Professor 
Henri Donnedieu de Vabres (France) and Major General Iona Nikitchenko (Soviet 
Union) made up the remainder of the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s authority was 
unchallengeable. According to the Tribunal, its jurisdiction came from the London 
Charter, which was created by the Allied Powers as a result of its rights and powers 
over the nations that had unconditionally surrendered to the Allies.
7
 
 
Article 16 of the Charter aimed to protect the due process rights of the accused. 
Justice Robert Jackson, chief prosecutor for the United States, recognised the 
importance and necessity of securing a just trial for the twenty-two defendants. In his 
opening statement he declared:
8
 
  
[We] must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today 
is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants 
a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well. 
 
Despite these noble intentions, the existence and protection of the defendants’ due 
process rights at Nuremberg is still contested. 
 
III Due Process: The Concept and its Application at Nuremberg 
 
The concept of due process is based upon equality and basic fairness, the common 
law origins of which stem from the Magna Carta,
9
 and were further developed in the 
English Bill of Rights 1688. While there are some differences between jurisdictions as 
                                                        
6
 Smith, above n 1, at 82. 
7
 Andreas Krieg “The Nuremberg Trials: An Attempt of Bringing War Criminals to Justice” (2009) 
The Pica Project <www.thepicaproject.org> at 6. 
8
 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol 2, 21 November 1945, at 100. 
9
 Magna Carta 1297; John Hostettler Champions of the Rule of Law (Waterside Press Ltd, Hampshire, 
2011) at 64; DJ Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1996) at 171. 
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to exactly what procedural due process is comprised of, there is a general consensus 
as to the basic elements.
10
  
 
Common law and civil law jurisdictions have different criminal procedures and 
different standards of due process. Common law states follow an adversarial trial 
procedure, emphasising the equality of arms between the parties, the right to cross-
examination and the right to counsel.
11
 Equality of arms is the concept that requires 
both the prosecution and the defence to have a reasonable opportunity to present their 
case at no disadvantage vis-à-vis the other side. Civil law procedure (continental 
Europe) is inquisitorial. The focus is on the pre-trial phase and emphasises judicial 
participation in the proceedings.
12
 When drafting the Charter, both systems 
necessarily had to be regarded. Justice Jackson observed the difficulty in this:
13
 
 
Members of the legal profession acquire a rather emotional attachment to forms 
and customs to which they are accustomed and frequently entertain a passionate 
conviction that no unfamiliar procedure can be morally right. 
 
The procedural rules adopted were an amalgamation of Anglo-American and 
continental European systems, though they were predominantly based on the 
American model.
14
 Stimson argued that a combination of both systems allowed for 
and protected the defendants’ rights under both.
15
 This compromise allowed the trial 
to proceed efficiently.
16
 
 
 
                                                        
10 Joel M Gora Due Process of Law (National Textbook Company, Illinois, 1979) at xi; David J 
Bodenhamer Our Rights (Oxford University Press, New York City, 2007) at 116. 
11
 Caroline Buisman “Defence and Fair Trial” in Roelof Haveman, Olga Kavran and Julian Nicholls 
(eds) Supranational Criminal Law: A System of Sui Generis (Antwerp, New York, 2003) 167 at 169. 
12 Buisman, above n 11, at 169. 
13
 Phillipe Kirsch “Applying the Principles of Nuremberg in the International Criminal Court” (2006) 6 
Wash U Global Stud L Rev 501 at 505. 
14
 Evan J Wallach “The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War Crimes Trials: 
Did They Provide An Outline For International Legal Procedure?” (1999) 37 Colum J Transnatl L 851 
at 854; Stimson, above n 1, at 186; Richard May and Marieke Wierda “Trends in International 
Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha” (1998–1999) 37 Colum J Transnatl L 
725 at 728; Kirsch, above n 13, at 505; Hans Ehard “The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War 
Criminals and International Law” (1949) 43 A J I L 223 at 226; H Wechsler “The Issues of the 
Nuremberg Trial” (1947) 62 The Academy of Political Science 11 at 13. 
15
 Stimson, above n 1, at 186. 
16
 Whitney R Harris Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg (Southern Methodist University 
Press, Dallas, 1954) at xxxv. 
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IV The Right to Counsel 
 
A History and Development 
 
A defendant’s right to counsel is viewed as one of the most fundamental rights 
accorded to accused people in criminal trials, in both continental and common law 
jurisdictions. Before the nineteenth century, it was generally the judge who examined 
the evidence, requiring little support from the defendant and their counsel.
17
 During 
the nineteenth century, the role of the accused developed and thus required the 
defence to undertake a more active role in proceedings.
18
 English law did not provide 
a defendant with the right to counsel until 1836, however this guarantee is now 
considered one of the most fundamental rights offered to criminal law defendants.
19
 
 
The right to counsel is viewed as an important component of an accused persons basic 
due process rights.
20
 This is also true in the international sphere. A defendant’s right 
to consult counsel and seek representation ensures that a defendant is treated fairly 
throughout the proceedings.
21
 The presence of counsel is a means of reducing power 
imbalances between defendants and the state, and of securing the right to equal 
justice.
22
  
 
B Application and Extent to which the Right was Breached at Nuremberg 
 
Article 16 of the Charter secured the defendants’ right to counsel.
23
 If a defendant 
failed to appoint counsel, the Tribunal would do so for him.
24
 Only one lawyer was 
                                                        
17
 Sarah J Summers Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedure Tradition and the European Court 
of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2007) at 79. 
18 Summers, above n 17, at 79. 
19
 Bodenhamer, above n 10, at 173; Kent Roach Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and 
Politics of Criminal Justice (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1999) at 88; Alexander Zahar and 
Goran Sluiter International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, New York City, 2008) at 309; 
Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand’s Constitution and Government 
(4th
 
ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) at 328. 
20
 Akhil Reed Amar The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles (BookCrafters Inc, 
Michigan, 1997) at 90; Philip A Joseph Constitutional & Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, 
Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at 180.  
21
 Palmer and Palmer, above n 19, at 328. 
22
 Summers, above n 17, at 82; Gora, above n 10, at 37; Palmer and Palmer, above n 19, at 328. 
23
 Article 16 (d). 
24 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol 2, Rules of Procedure, Rule 2(d). 
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permitted to appear at the trial for any defendant (in absence of special permission 
from the Tribunal).
25
 The defendants’ right to conduct their own defence was 
expressly provided for in the Charter. However, when Rudolf Hess stated that he was 
actually prepared to do so, this right was ignored.
26
 All of the defendants were 
represented by counsel.
27
 
 
The Tribunal established a secretariat office to manage the trial’s administration. 
British officer, Major Neave, served the defendants with the indictment and offered 
assistance in finding counsel.
28
 Neave explained to the defendants their rights under 
the Charter.
29
 One month prior to the eve of the trial, Neave presented the defendants 
with a list of sixty suitable lawyers and legal professors to select from.
30
 
Alternatively, the defendants were entitled to request counsel of their choosing, who 
then had to be approved by the Tribunal.
31
 
 
All chosen counsel were prominent German lawyers and professors.
32
 Almost half of 
the defence counsel had Nazi backgrounds- some even “ardent and unrepentant” 
Nazis.
33
 Six were in fact proven to have been members of the Nazi Party.
34
 Major 
General Nikitchenko and Lieutenant Colonel Volchkov (Soviet alternate) voted 
against the acceptance of these six as counsel, however the other Tribunal members 
outvoted them.
35
 The Tribunal never rejected those chosen as counsel. This leniency 
is evidence of the Tribunal’s efforts to provide the best possible opportunity for the 
defendants to present their defences.  
 
                                                        
25
 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol 2, Rules of Procedure, Rule 2(d). 
26
 Werner Maser Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial trans Richard Barry (Penguin Books Ltd, London, 
1977) at 73. 
27 Arthur L Goodhart “The Legality of the Nuremberg Trials” in Guenael Mettraux (ed) Perspectives 
on the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 626 at 629; Brian Orend The 
Morality of War (Broadview Press, Peterborough, 2006) at 171. 
28
 Robert E Conot Justice at Nuremberg (Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1983) at 78. 
29 Lord Justice Lawrence “The Nuremberg Trial” (1947) 23 J Intl Aff 151 at 151–152. 
30
 Conot, above n 28, at 78; Bradley F Smith Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (Basic Books, 
Michigan, 1977) at 82. 
31
 Eugene Davidson The Trial of the Germans: An Account of the Twenty-Two Defendants Before the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1997) at 30. 
32
 Stimson, above n 1, at 186. 
33
 Stimson, above n 1, at 186; Conot, above n 28, at 83. 
34
 Maser, above n 26, at 74. 
35 Maser, above n 26, at 74. 
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The Allies covered defence counsel’s expenses. They were paid, fed, housed and 
provided with offices and assistants.
36
 While some counsel had supported Nazism, 
others opposed it and considered it to blame for all of Germany’s suffering.
37
 Despite 
this, defence counsel suffered harassment and disrespect by the German public, press, 
and some Allied staff. Counsel were criticised and vilified by reporters of the 
Nuremberg proceedings.
38
 Further, defence counsel were often treated with the same 
hostility as the accused, and were made to feel like second-class citizens.
39
  
 
However, the judges (particularly Lord Justice Lawrence) went to great lengths to 
ensure defence counsel were respected within the Tribunal and in the media. The 
judges recognised that without the assistance of defence counsel, a credible trial 
would have been impossible.
40
 Lord Justice Lawrence made a point of observing, “In 
the opinion of the Tribunal, Defence counsel have performed an important public duty 
in accordance with the high traditions of the legal profession”.
41
 Lord Justice 
Lawrence criticised Allied occupation powers for allowing press attacks on defence 
counsel, and stressed that defence counsel was and would remain under the protection 
of the Tribunal.
42
 The judges highlighted that further public attacks would not be 
tolerated by the Court.
43
 
 
Faced with such animosity, acting as counsel for the Nazi defendants was no doubt a 
task of considerable difficulty. Defence counsel perceived the odds as against them, 
and were expected to openly defend Nazism- a cause many did not necessarily 
support. Despite this, counsel often presented clever defences for the accused. Otto 
Kranzbuhler, counsel for Grand Admiral Doenitz, was considered one of the sharpest 
defence lawyers during the trial.
44
 Kranzbuhler crafted a defence by presenting an 
interrogatory to United States Admiral Nimitz that obtained information about United 
                                                        
36
 Stimson, above n 1, at 186. 
37
 Smith, above n 30, at 82.  
38
 William Maley “The Atmospherics of the Nuremberg Trial” in David A Blumenthal and Timothy 
LH McCormack (eds) The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance? 
(Koninklijke Brill, Leiden, 2008) 3 at 8. 
39
 Smith, above n 30, at 83.  
40
 Maley, above n 38, at 7–8. 
41 Karl Bader “Review” in Wilbourn E Benton and George E Grimm (eds) Nuremberg: German Views 
on the War Trials (Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1955) 153 at 157. 
42
 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol 8, 5 March 1946, at 532–533. 
43
 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol 8, 5 March 1946, at 531. 
44 Maley, above n 38, at 8. 
 10
States naval practice. Kranzbuhler used this information to argue that Doenitz’s 
actions were comparable to those of the United States Admiral, and consequently 
were in accordance with war at sea practices and therefore not criminal.
45
 
Kranzbuhler crafted this argument in a way that could not be rejected as being a 
prohibited tu quoque (“you, too”) defence. This defence was partially successful, and 
the Tribunal found Doenitz not guilty on count one of the indictment.
46
 While many 
of the defence counsel presented well-thought out and researched defences, their 
unfamiliarity with proceedings meant that they were often at a significant 
disadvantage during the trial. 
 
All German lawyers, defence counsel were acquainted with German legal procedure, 
and not the Anglo-American trial procedure that prevailed. Defence counsel had to 
quickly familiarise themselves with the Anglo-American accusatory model.
47
 Given 
that there was only a thirty day period between the serving of the indictments and the 
beginning of the trial, counsel would have been primarily focused on looking through 
evidence and building defences, leaving little to no time to get accustomed to trial 
procedure. This disadvantaged defence counsel during the trial, and they were 
criticised for being “clumsy and unimaginative”.
48
 Firstly, they were unprepared 
during cross-examination.
49
 Secondly, they were often unfamiliar with how to handle 
evidence from interrogatories, as demonstrated in an awkward exchange between 
Lord Justice Lawrence and Alfred Thoma, counsel for Alfred Rosenberg.
50
 
 
Despite its express protection in the Charter, the defendants were denied the right to 
act as their own counsel during the trial. When Hess stated that he was prepared to act 
as his own counsel, this right was ignored. In denying Hess this right, the prosecution 
was arguably doing him a favour. Hess was exhibiting signs of amnesia and insanity, 
and any effort made to argue his own case would likely have been compromised, and 
ultimately ineffective. However, the opportunity to argue one’s own case is inherent 
in the right to counsel. Even when taking into consideration Hess’ unusual personal 
                                                        
45
 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol 13, 8 May 1946, at 230–245. 
46 Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of a crime against peace. 
47
 Krieg, above n 7, at 14. 
48
 Smith, above n 30, at 100. 
49
 Krieg, above n 7, at 14. 
50 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol 2, 15 November 1945, at 18. 
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circumstances, this deprivation was a direct breach of the defendants’ due process 
rights. 
 
Therefore, the defendants’ right to counsel was partly upheld at the IMT. Defendants 
were entitled to representation by counsel of their choosing, and counsel were often 
clever with defences. However, defendants were denied the right to act as their own 
counsel. Further, counsel’s ability to act effectively was partly compromised due to 
their unfamiliarity with the Anglo-American trial procedure, and the harassment they 
suffered from the public and press. 
 
V The Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent and 
Impartial Court 
 
A History and Development 
 
A defendant’s right to a fair trial is at the heart of criminal proceedings.
51
 While the 
concept of a ‘fair trial’ often encompasses all due process rights, this paper will focus 
on the more specific interpretation of ‘fairness’ as the notion of equality.
52
  
 
The right to a public trial is a fundamental right of due process. However, in some 
jurisdictions, this right is not absolute.
53
 In nineteenth century continental Europe and 
England, the requirement of a public hearing was widely contested. By the end of the 
century, it was a fundamental right in most European legal systems.
54
 The right to a 
public hearing has many rationales. First, public inspection and criticism of the 
process provides a sense of legitimacy.
55
 Second, it operates as public denunciation of 
                                                        
51 Zahar and Sluiter, above n 19, at 292. 
52
 Pascal Chenivesse and Christopher J Piranio “What Price Justice? On the Evolving Notion of ‘Right 
to Fair Trial’ from Nuremberg to The Hague” (2011) 24 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 
403 at 404; David Feldman (ed) English Public Law (Oxford University Press, London, 2004) at 678–
679. 
53
 Gora, above n 10, at 107. 
54
 Summers, above n 17, at 39. 
55
 Summers, above n 17, at 43; Thurman Arnold “Due Process in Trials” (1955) 300 Annals Am Acad 
Pol and Soc Sci 123 at 124–126. 
 12
the conduct. Third, it strengthens public confidence in the system by demonstrating 
the ability of authorities to hold people to account and punish them for their actions.
56
  
 
The concept of an independent trial stems from Montesquieu’s eighteenth century 
separation of powers theory.
 57
 The legislature, executive and judiciary must remain 
separate to provide checks and balances and prevent abuses of power. Judicial 
independence is thus of great importance in the context of an international tribunal. 
This concept should therefore have been borne in mind when appointing tribunal 
members. 
 
Judges must be impartial in the sense that they must have no preconceived opinions of 
the defendants and have no stake in the outcome of the trial. Nor should they act in a 
way that promotes the interests of one party at the expense of the other. A tribunal 
must operate in absence of prejudice and bias.
58
  
 
B Fair Hearing at Nuremberg 
 
While the right to a fair hearing encompasses many of the rights discussed, it is an 
important stand-alone right in terms of basic equality, particularly in the context of a 
post-war ad hoc tribunal such as Nuremberg. Article 16 of the Charter protected the 
defendants’ right to a fair trial by ensuring certain legal procedures were followed. 
The Allied drafters believed that the inclusion of this Article would “do justice to the 
defendants” and protect their fair trial rights.
59
 However, Article 16 related to 
‘fairness’ and due process rights more broadly, and thus this Article will not be the 
focus of this section. Throughout this section, the concept of fairness will be narrowly 
interpreted to mean equality. 
 
There is much debate surrounding whether the Nazi defendants received a ‘fair’ trial 
at Nuremberg. The majority of historical and legal opinion is that given the 
                                                        
56 Summers, above n 17, at 44. 
57
 Charles-Louis de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws 1748 trans Thomas Nugent 
(D Appleton and Company, New York, 1900). 
58
 Feldman, above n 52, at 679. 
59 Krieg, above n 7, at 7. 
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circumstances, the defendants were given a fair trial.
60
 However, some critics argue 
that the trial was unfair.
61
 As the concept of fairness is broad and often flexible, such 
assessments must be approached with caution. Evaluating fairness specifically in 
terms of equality, this paper argues that while inequalities existed between the 
prosecution and defence, the efforts of the judges operated to mitigate these 
inequalities.  
 
The majority of the surveyed German population regarded the trials as being justly 
conducted. The Office of Military Government of the United States carried out 
surveys throughout Germany before, during and after the trial. At the beginning of the 
trial, approximately eighty per cent of Germans surveyed considered that the 
Nuremberg trial was being conducted justly and fairly. Only two per cent believed 
that it was not, and the remainder had no opinion. By October 1946, approximately 
seventy-seven per cent considered the trial was being conducted fairly, and three per 
cent thought it was not (the remainder with no opinion).
62
 Although far from 
conclusive, these figures indicate that the vast majority of Germans surveyed 
considered the trial fair and did not significantly change their minds over the course 
of the year. While the German public may have been unfamiliar with the intricacies of 
the legal procedure adopted at Nuremberg, these figures suggest that even amongst 
the vanquished nation, less than five per cent of citizens surveyed had any significant 
concerns with the fairness of the trial. 
 
The equality of the trial regarding the legal procedure adopted can be questioned. As 
previously mentioned, the trial ran largely according to Anglo-American legal 
proceedings- a method unfamiliar to the defendants and to their counsel. This meant 
                                                        
60
 Maley, above n 38, at 9; HT King “The Judgments and Legacy of Nuremberg” (1997) 22 Yale J Intl 
L 213 at 221; Jennifer K Elsea “CRS Report for Congress, RL31262: Selected Procedural Safeguards 
in Federal, Military and International Courts” (18 September 2006) Federation of American Scientists 
<www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31262.pdf> at 7; Stimson, above n 1; Carl Haensel “The Nuremberg 
Trials Revisited” (1963–1964) 13 DePaul L Rev 248 at 258; Jan Schnitzer “The Nuremberg Justice 
Trial 1947: Vengeance of the Victors?” (LLM Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2010); 
Orend, above n 27, at 171; Smith, above n 30, at 22–23; Lukman Harees The Mirage of Dignity on the 
Highways of Human ‘Progress’: The Bystanders Perspective (AuthorHouse, Bloomington, 2012) at 
346; Wallach, above n 14, at 852; May and Wierda, above n 14, at 727; Fichtelberg, above n 1, at 6. 
61
 Krieg, above n 7. 
62 (OMGUS Report No. 60, Trends in German Public Opinion) in Susanne Karsdedt “The Nuremberg 
Tribunal and German Society: International Justice and Local Judgment in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction” in David A Blumenthal and Timothy LH McCormack (eds) The Legacy of 
Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance? (Koninklijke Brill, Leiden, 2008) 13 
at 20. 
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that the defence was at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis the prosecution. Defence 
counsel were forced to quickly learn and adapt to the unfamiliar Anglo-American 
procedure. There was thus no equality between the prosecution and the defence 
regarding the trial procedure adopted. In fact, the reliance on documentary evidence 
reflected continental European legal procedure. However, this actually operated to 
disadvantage the defence because of the sheer quantity of documents the Allies 
submitted as evidence.
63
 Given the comparatively short time frame the defence had to 
deal with the mass of documents and the fewer resources the defence had at their 
disposal to do so, there was no real equality of arms between the parties. 
 
However, the Tribunal attempted to mitigate this inequality by allowing defence 
counsel to discuss the case with the Tribunal. British alternate, Norman Birkett, 
argued that it was highly unusual and possibly “very bad” for a court to discuss the 
case with defence counsel.
64
 Biddle countered:
65
 
 
I don’t feel that at all. The great criticism of this trial is going to be that the defendants 
had very little time to prepare, were not properly represented, that their lawyers labored 
under impossible difficulties, that they were confused when they went on. 
 
It is therefore important that the judges recognised the substantial inequality that 
existed between the prosecution and the defence. The procedures they enacted in 
attempt to mitigate this inequality is further evidence of the Tribunal’s determination 
to secure a fair trial for the defendants. 
 
The major obstacle in preventing an equality of arms and thus a fair trial was the one-
sidedness of the charges. The Nuremberg Trial is widely criticised for not allowing 
the tu quoque defence, which meant that the Allies could not be charged with the 
offences they were charging the defendants with, despite having committed them. To 
prevent Allied acts being called into question, the prosecution based the charges 
solely on German documentation.
66
 The defendants were prohibited from presenting 
evidence that implicated the Allies in any war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
                                                        
63
 Smith, above n 30, at 83. 
64
 Conot, above n 28, at 86. 
65
 Conot, above n 28, at 86. 
66 Smith, above n 30, at 102. 
 15
crimes against the peace.
67
 This can be contrasted from Kranzbuhler’s framing of 
Admiral Doenitz’s defence as mentioned above. The absence of this tu quoque 
defence significantly compromised the equality (and therefore fairness) of the trial. 
 
Therefore, the primary barrier preventing an equality of arms between the parties (and 
thus a fair trial) was that the tu quoque defence was unavailable to the defendants. 
While significant inequalities existed between the prosecution and the defence in 
terms of the style of legal procedure adopted during the trial, the procedures enacted 
by the Tribunal and the efforts of the judges (particularly Lord Justice Lawrence) 
operated to mitigate these inequalities.  
 
C Public Hearing at Nuremberg 
 
The Nuremberg trials at the IMT were public hearings. In constructing the Palace of 
Justice to hold the trial, a gallery was built to hold over 250 visitors and members of 
the press.
68
 The IMT had hundreds of staff who were able to attend the trials, and 
press and private citizens were given the opportunity to observe the proceedings from 
the visitor’s gallery.
69
 The hearings were open to the German public, and international 
reporters and visitors had unrestricted access.
70
 The Charter required that copies of the 
proceedings be made available in multiple languages.
71
 
 
Given that the prosecution relied predominantly on documentary evidence, the 
audience was largely comprised of counsel, onlookers and correspondents. 
Encounters with victims and witnesses were therefore unlikely.
72
 
 
Public interest in the trial peaked at the beginning and the end of the trial; during the 
months in between the gallery was half empty.
73
 The public sessions of the Tribunal 
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continued throughout the trial, however the Tribunal met “behind the scenes” from 
June until September 1946.
74
 This does not detract from the public nature of the 
hearings, as private deliberations between judges are expected. Therefore, the 
defendants’ right to a public hearing was upheld. 
 
D Independent Tribunal at Nuremberg 
 
The independence of the Nuremberg Tribunal has been widely criticised. 
Independence in terms of Montesquieu’s separation of powers theory is not usually a 
concern in international tribunals, because there is no identifiable executive, 
legislative, or judicial body.
75
 The IMT was an ad hoc tribunal, and was governed by 
one specific Charter drawn up by the Allied Powers for the purpose of prosecuting the 
Nazi defendants, who were to be tried before a tribunal of judges appointed by the 
Allies. Thus, the concept of independence will be examined in terms of judicial 
independence. It is therefore important that the Tribunal, as the ‘judiciary’ and the 
body interpreting the law, maintained independence from the lawmakers. 
 
The Tribunal at Nuremberg was not independent because there was a substantial 
overlap between lawmaker, prosecutor and judge. Justice Jackson was the primary 
United States representative in London involved in drafting the Charter. He 
subsequently played a part in selecting the defendants to be tried, and became the 
chief United States prosecutor during the trial. Sir Maxwell Fyfe acted in a similar 
capacity for the United Kingdom. Major General Nikitchenko conducted negotiations 
for the Soviet Union in regards to the drafting of the Charter, and later sat as the 
Soviet Union’s primary voting judge on the Tribunal bench. Robert Falco was the 
principal French legislator of the Charter, and subsequently sat as the French alternate 
on the Tribunal.
76
 These overlaps are fundamentally inconsistent with the notion of 
judicial independence. 
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Further, not only were there overlaps in the administration of justice at Nuremberg, 
the law makers, prosecutors and Tribunal judges were all from the victorious Allied 
nations. The defense had strong objections against this:
77
 
 
… [T]he defense consider it their duty to point out at this juncture another 
peculiarity of this Trial which departs from the commonly recognised principles 
of modern jurisprudence. This one party to the proceedings is all in one: creator 
of the statute of the Tribunal and of the rules of law, prosecutor and judge.  
 
Defence counsel requested that the Court obtain the expert opinion of internationally 
recognised international law scholars about the legal foundations of the IMT. The 
Tribunal rejected this application.
78
 No neutral states or any of the Axis Powers were 
involved in the drafting of the Charter or sat on the Tribunal bench. Critics argue that 
the presence of a neutral nation (such as Switzerland or Sweden) would have 
enhanced the Tribunal’s credibility.
79
 However, many neutral states often affiliated 
more with either the Allies or the Axis Powers. In light of this, and the post-war 
political climate, it was arguably not practical to have a Tribunal composed of any 
states but those of the victorious Allied Powers.  
 
Therefore, the overlap between the drafters of the Charter, the prosecutors and the 
judges, and the fact that all three parts were comprised solely of individuals from the 
victorious Allied powers considerably compromised the judicial independence of the 
Tribunal at Nuremberg. However, it is important to recognise that the concepts of 
independence and impartiality are not synonymous. Independence is primarily 
concerned with the Tribunal’s compilation, whereas impartiality looks to its 
operation. Consequently, it is possible for one to exist without the other. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the independence of the Tribunal is not crucial so long as the 
Tribunal is impartial.
80
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E Impartial Tribunal at Nuremberg 
 
The Nuremberg Tribunal mostly managed to secure an atmosphere of impartiality. 
However, the Tribunal’s impartiality can be questioned regarding the four victors on 
the bench, and also due to existing Tribunal member prejudice. At the opening session 
of the Trial, the four judges professed, “I solemnly declare that I will exercise all my 
powers and duties as a member of the International Military Tribunal honourably, 
impartially, and conscientiously.”
81
 While great efforts were made to honour this 
declaration, and such efforts were often successful, the impartiality of the Tribunal 
remains a contentious element of the trial. 
 
The victorious nations of the War sat on the Tribunal to judge the defeated. United 
States Senator Robert Taft declared, “The trial of the vanquished by the victors cannot 
be impartial.”
82
 The Allies suffered tremendous losses during the war at the hands of 
the Germans. The argument is that the victors would not be well equipped to judge 
the German war leaders because they would not be free from “hatred, passion and 
national prejudice.”
83
 As citizens of the victorious nations, the judges occasionally 
interacted with members of the prosecution. During the trial, Soviet prosecutor Andrei 
Vyshinsky came to Nuremberg to sit with the prosecution. While he was visiting, a 
party was held in his honour, which the prosecution and Tribunal judges attended.
84
 
Such interaction could have made impartiality difficult. 
 
Further, Soviet judge Major General Nikitchenko openly expressed prejudice toward 
the defendants. During the London negotiations, Nikitchenko revealed his belief that 
the purpose of the trial was to determine the appropriate punishment to be given to the 
Nazi defendants, whose guilt had already been determined.
85
 Such sentiment is 
indicative of a bias held towards the defendants, and demonstrates that Major General 
Nikitchenko had adopted a preconceived notion of guilt before having heard any of 
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the evidence. If Major General Nikitchenko was swayed by this preconception, the 
credibility and impartiality of the Tribunal would have been significantly 
compromised. However, Major General Nikitchenko was not a main power on the 
bench, and he did not carry as significant an influence (relative to Lord Justice 
Lawrence and Francis Biddle). There is nothing to suggest that his pre-trial 
disposition led him to judge the guilt of the defendants on anything other than 
evidence presented by both sides during the trial.
86
 With hindsight, the impartiality of 
the Tribunal may have been better secured had Nikitchenko not gone on to sit as one 
of the four voting judges. 
 
The Tribunal’s impartiality can further be questioned in relation to the evidential rules 
of the Charter. Article 19 of the Charter provided that the Tribunal was not bound by 
strict rules of evidence. Article 21 provided that the Tribunal did not require proof of 
facts of common knowledge. What exactly could be considered ‘facts of common 
knowledge’ was not further explained in the Charter. In the context of war, the 
Tribunal’s ability to objectively assess such documents to determine ‘facts of 
common knowledge’ can be seriously questioned.
87
  
 
The perceived impartiality of the Tribunal is largely due to the efforts of Lord Justice 
Lawrence to make it so. Lord Justice Lawrence ruled the Tribunal from the bench, 
and was above all focused on ruling fairly and impartially.
88
 Historical and legal 
consensus remains that Lord Justice Lawrence created the distinct impression and 
atmosphere of impartiality on the Tribunal bench.
89
 This was a conscious effort on 
Lord Justice Lawrence’s behalf:
90
 
 
If Lawrence was thought to have erred in giving too much scope to a defendant, 
then he would have felt he had erred on the right side; better to shoulder some 
personal criticism than have the whole trial dismissed as partial to the 
prosecution. 
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Lord Justice Lawrence was determined to ensure the Trial remained impartial, 
insisting on evenhandedness throughout.
91
 It has been argued that Lord Justice 
Lawrence in fact “bent over backwards” to ensure the defendants were given an equal 
opportunity to present their defences.
92
 This received much criticism from the 
prosecution, and also from other members of the Tribunal.
93
 Lord Justice Lawrence’s 
dedication to remaining impartial was evident during cross-examination. 
 
Justice Jackson’s cross-examination of Reich Marshal Goering is one of the most 
discussed moments of the trial. Jackson was noticeably irritated by Goering’s lengthy 
responses, and argued that he was unnecessarily prolonging the trial. Jackson 
requested that Goering be limited to  ‘yes/no’ answers to the questions. Lord Justice 
Lawrence intervened on behalf of Goering, stating:
94
 
 
Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal thinks the witness ought to be allowed to make 
what explanation he thinks right… after having given a direct answer to any 
question, he may make a short explanation; and that he is not to be confined 
simply to making direct answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
 
Goering proceeded to speak relatively uninterrupted for nine days. This cross-
examination was valuable insofar as it revealed the Tribunal’s impartiality.
95
 
Arguably, Lord Justice Lawrence’s dedication to remaining impartial throughout the 
Trial was the most successful means of securing the defendants’ due process rights. 
His impartiality operated to relieve the suspicions of defence counsel that the Tribunal 
and Charter were established solely for the purpose of convicting the defendants.
96
 
 
Francis Biddle also strived to remain impartial. Justice Jackson argued that the Court 
should not set up its own administrative body, but should work hand-in-hand with the 
prosecution administration. Biddle was strongly opposed to this suggestion, arguing 
that to maintain independence and impartiality, it was imperative that the Tribunal ran 
a separate administration. Jackson disagreed, stating that this was not an ordinary 
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trial, and remnants of independence and impartiality had been dismissed when 
Nikitchenko had exercised a role in drafting the Charter and later sat on the Tribunal 
bench. As Biddle had acted in a similar dual capacity, he was thus even more 
determined to remain impartial.
97
   
 
Critics have argued that Lord Justice Lawrence almost over-compensated in ensuring 
impartiality on the part of the Tribunal. Few Germans doubted the impartiality and 
objectivity of the judges. In fact, it has been argued that the majority was of the 
opinion that objectivity was carried too far.
98
 Following Justice Jackson’s 
unsuccessful cross-examination of Goering, Jackson arranged a private meeting with 
Biddle, during which he accused the members of the Tribunal of always ruling in 
favour of the defendants.
99
 This allegation suggests that Jackson was concerned about 
the judges over-compensating in an effort to remain impartial. 
 
Further, the Tribunal produced three acquittals. For a guilty verdict, three out of four 
votes were required. This suggests that most of the judges did not have 
preconceptions regarding the guilt of the defendants, and ruled solely on the evidence 
put before them. Such a lack of prejudice in the judgments is further evidence of the 
Tribunal’s impartiality. 
 
Therefore, the efforts of Lord Justice Lawrence contributed to the impartiality of the 
Tribunal. However, its impartiality can be questioned insofar as the preconceptions of 
Major General Nikitchenko and the evidentiary leniencies are concerned. 
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VI The Right to Adequate Time and Facilities to Prepare and Present a 
Defence 
 
A History and Development 
 
The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare and present a defence is a central 
right accorded to criminal defendants in both Anglo-American and continental 
European jurisdictions. The fundamental right of audi alteram partem provides that no 
defendant shall be judged without the opportunity to present their case and respond to 
the evidence given against them.
100
 This is consistent with the above principle of 
equality of arms. 
 
What is considered to be ‘adequate’ time to prepare a defence is very case specific, 
and it is impossible to set a universally applicable standard.
101
 The post-war context 
and ad hoc Tribunal could arguably be factors influencing what is considered to be  
‘adequate’ time. ‘Facilities’ broadly encompasses four elements: the rights of access 
to the case file, the right of discovery, the discovery of ‘hidden material’ and 
investigation by the defence.
102
 In theory, the prosecution is under an obligation to 
disclose all material evidence that is relevant to the defendant’s case.
103
 
 
American rules of evidence are stricter and more extensive than European evidential 
law. Most continental jurisdictions have flexible rules of evidence, and operate an 
‘inquisitorial’ system.
104
 An inquisitorial system places “singular importance on 
ascertaining the truth at trial”, and thus “erects few evidentiary barriers that restrict 
the information the judge can consider in determining guilt.”
105
 This can be contrasted 
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with the Anglo-American adversarial process. Hearsay proof is accepted under 
German law.
106
 
 
B Application and Extent to which the Right was Breached at Nuremberg 
 
The limited time granted to the defendants to prepare their defence and the barriers 
they faced in accessing the necessary evidence to prepare those defences is arguably 
one of the grossest breaches of due process rights at Nuremberg. However, the 
defendants’ right to present their defences and the ability to cross-examine witnesses 
was generally upheld, with the exception of ex parte witness affidavits. 
 
The Charter had loose evidentiary rules, which were more akin to continental 
European legal procedure. As discussed, Article 19 of the Charter provided that the 
Tribunal was not to be bound by technical rules of evidence, and was at liberty to 
admit any evidence which it deemed to have “probative value”. Article 16 provided 
safeguards to the defendants. Under the Charter, the defendants had to be served with 
the indictment in German at a reasonable time before the trial, and had the right to 
access a translation of the trial.
107
 The defendants had the right to give any 
explanation relevant to the charges made against him.
108
 The defendants had the right 
to counsel, and through that counsel had the right to present evidence at the trial to 
support his defence, and also had the right to cross-examine any witnesses called by 
the prosecution.
109
 
 
The prosecution had in their possession an enormous quantity of German 
documentation to use as evidence in the trial. A group of military personnel 
established by the Allies were tasked with seizing and preserving all material German 
documents, records and archives in preparation for the trial.
110
 By November 1945, 
the prosecution had over 17,000 pages of oral evidence, and over 22,000 pages of 
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written evidence.
111
 The prosecution subsequently submitted approximately 12,000–
15,000 pages to the Tribunal.
112
 
 
The defendants were granted thirty days of preparation from the serving of the 
indictment to the opening of the trial. Thirty days was inadequate, given the 
“documentary avalanche”
113
 of evidence that the prosecution had gathered in the 
years leading up to the trial that had to be examined by defence counsel, the time the 
defence counsel had to spend getting acquainted with the unfamiliar procedural 
system, and the barriers faced by the defence counsel in accessing evidence crucial to 
the defence case. Thirty days of preparation inevitably became twenty-one, when 
twelve defendants had not secured counsel three weeks prior to the trial.
114
 
 
One of the grossest deprivations of due process rights was the defendants’ lack of 
access to evidence held by the prosecution prior to the trial. This is a direct denial of 
the right to adequate facilities to prepare a defence. The prosecution had thoroughly 
searched the German archives, and had seized all evidence relevant to the case. 
Remaining documents (of which there were few) were left for the defence.
115
 Such 
evidence was gathered and held in limited access document centres. Even some of the 
most crucial and exonerating material held by the prosecution was not made available 
to the defence.
116
 Occupying authorities barred the access of defence counsel to the 
necessary document archives, and they were unable to make the investigations 
necessary to form their defences.
117
 Even while the Trial was in progress, access to 
material documentation remained difficult for the defence.
118
 
 
The defence also faced difficulties accessing books and information from overseas. It 
was impossible for the defence to access a copy of the Foreign Minister of Romania 
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and Ambassador to the Soviet Union’s article detailing the events leading up to the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union.
119
 Similarly, the defence was denied access to a 
copy of General George Marshall’s final war report, which was available in Allied 
newspapers.
120
 Arguably, it would have been possible for the defendants to somehow 
gain access to this report. However, this demonstrates the additional obstacles defence 
counsel had to overcome when preparing the defence case, and the reluctance of the 
prosecution to provide the defence with the necessary evidence. In one instance, the 
prosecution disclosed documents to the press which they had neglected to provide 
translated copies of to the defence. Biddle and Lord Justice Lawrence viewed this as a 
direct breach of Court orders.
121
 
 
The lack of access to documents was often as a result of the deliberate withholding of 
evidence by the prosecution. Initially, Justice Jackson indicated the willingness of the 
prosecution to make evidence available to the defence. When the Tribunal directed 
him to do so, he was reluctant to assist the defence.
122
 Before the defence could access 
any documentary evidence, the prosecution ordered that counsel must first state what 
they were looking for and then make a specific request. No indexes or summaries 
were provided; therefore without knowing what the documents contained, defence 
counsel were unable to make any sort of specific request.
123
 When defence counsel 
did request copies of documents from the prosecution, they had often ‘disappeared’, 
or were made available in insufficient quantities, incomplete, not translated, and days 
too late.
124
 During the trial, Justice Jackson suggested that the defence should not be 
permitted to read its documents into the records, and instead should be limited to 
submitting the document books to the judges. Dr. Dix (counsel for Hjalmar Schacht) 
addressed the Court in response:
125
 
 
I cannot consider it just and I cannot consider it fair if the prosecution had the 
right, for months, not only once but sometimes repeatedly and often, to bring 
their evidence to the knowledge of the public… The defence counsel must and 
                                                        
119
 Grigore Gafencu “Politics, A Warning Cry: Prelude to the Russian Campaign” May 1946 in 
Davidson, above n 31, at 34. 
120
 Davidson, above n 31, at 34. 
121 Smith, above n 30, at 84. 
122
 Smith, above n 30, at 78. 
123
 Davidson, above n 31, at 31. 
124
 Maser, above n 26, at 98. 
125 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol 9, 22 March 1946, at 661. 
 26
would consider it a severe and intolerable limitation of the defence, if, contrary 
to the procedure exercised so far by the prosecution, it were deprived of the 
possibility of presenting, in its turn, at least the relevant parts of its own 
documentary evidence to the Tribunal verbally and with comments. 
 
The judges ruled against Jackson and in favour of the defendants.
126
 
 
As a result of the flexible evidential rules, the Tribunal accepted ex parte witness 
affidavits from the prosecution, depriving the defendants the right of cross-
examination. While the Charter expressly gave defendants the right of cross-
examination, it did not prevent the prosecution from introducing ex parte affidavits. 
Often, the people who wrote the affidavits were unavailable to testify during the trial, 
denying the defence the right to cross-examine any witnesses.
127
 Witnesses were often 
unwilling to personally testify before the defendants and the Tribunal, or were 
practically unable to (many were in jail and others lived a great distance from 
Nuremberg).
128
 The Tribunal accepted such affidavits despite objections from defence 
counsel.
129
 Depriving the defendants this right to cross-examine witnesses is a direct 
denial of their rights to present a defence, and thus a gross breach of their due process 
rights. 
 
 Further, the defendants were faced with language and translation difficulties, which 
exacerbated the time pressures in preparing the defence case. When the defence 
requested copies of documentation from the prosecution, they were often provided 
only in English.
130
 Once the documents were eventually translated, errors were 
found.
131
  
 
Lord Justice Lawrence acknowledged the weaknesses of the defence in terms of the 
time and facilities available to prepare their cases, and made some efforts to mitigate 
these inadequacies. On 22 November 1945, assistant trial counsel for the United 
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States, Frank Wallis, was discussing sections of the indictment. Lord Justice 
Lawrence stopped Wallis, and ordered that before he be allowed to continue, he must 
make available translated copies to the defence counsel.
132
 Further, Dr. Dix addressed 
the Tribunal regarding the difficulties they were facing in terms of having adequate 
time and facilities to prepare their defences, given the unfamiliar Anglo-American 
procedures. Lord Justice Lawrence ruled in favour of the defence. The Tribunal 
ordered that to be accepted into evidence, every prosecution document must go 
through a four-language translation system, and the process must give defence 
counsel adequate time to object.
133
 
 
However, the Tribunal members had the authority to refuse to accept defence 
evidence, which infringed on their rights to present a defence. Defence counsel were 
under the obligation to inform the judges of any evidence to be presented by the 
defence. Under the Charter, the judges could refuse to accept the evidence into the 
trial if they ruled it did not have practical “relevance”.
134
 This was a wide discretion 
given to the judges as a result of the flexible evidential rules, leaving the rules open to 
abuse, ultimately to the disadvantage of the defence. While Lord Justice Lawrence 
was thorough in explaining this procedure to the defence, it did little to help them.
135
 
 
The lack of time granted to the defendants to prepare a defence, the lack of access to 
necessary documentary evidence, the translation difficulties, abuse of flexible 
evidentiary rules and acceptance of ex parte affidavits in conjunction operated to 
deprive the Nuremberg defendants of the adequate time and facilities to prepare and 
present a defence. 
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VII The Right of Appeal to a Higher Court or Tribunal 
 
A History and Development 
 
The right to appeal a case to a higher court or tribunal is recognised and protected in 
both continental and common law jurisdictions. The right of appeal has a complex 
history. Criminal appeal rights in continental Europe can be traced back to Roman 
times.
136
 In contrast, the modern right of criminal appeal was not formally recognised 
in Anglo-American jurisdictions until the turn of the twentieth century.
 137
 The right 
of appeal has thus developed over time, and has only recently been recognised as a 
fundamental due process right. However, it is often only the right to a limited appeal. 
In the United States and England, the appealed case is not looked at completely 
anew.
138
 The broad right of appeal is not present in the United States Bill of Rights.
139
 
 
The right of appeal is considered fundamental because it provides an opportunity for 
potential errors made in the first instance to be corrected. Particularly in a post-war 
international context, the right of appeal is a crucial means of mitigating potential 
prejudice and bias.  
 
Appeal rights are a means of preventing miscarriages of justice and securing the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice process.
140
 Appeal processes also operate to achieve 
consistency in trial courts, though arguably this is inapplicable in the context of ad 
hoc international military courts without a jury. 
 
B Application and Extent to which the Right was Breached at Nuremberg 
 
Article 26 of the Charter provided that the judgment of the Tribunal as to guilt or 
innocence shall give reasons, and shall be final and not subject to appeal or review. 
The right of appeal was altogether denied: there was no appellate instance to neither 
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affirm nor reject the judgments or sentences. In the interests of time and expense, the 
Allies desired a full and final judgment.
141
 Deprivation of this fundamental right to 
have the Nuremberg judgments evaluated at a higher appellate level has been 
considered one of the most “procedurally dubious” and controversial elements of the 
trial.
142
 
 
Given the unique historical and political context, an appellate instance was not 
entirely practicable. Justice Jackson and the other Allies agreed that in the context of a 
trial of a “tiny number of notorious men who had dominated the world stage for a 
dozen years”, an appellate Tribunal was impractical and unnecessary.
143
 Realistically, 
it is difficult to see where any reasonable appeal could have been made. 
 
However, the defendants in the subsequent Nuremberg trials were given rights of 
appeal, although these rights were limited. Arguably, this was a direct result of the 
criticism voiced in response to the IMT defendants receiving no appeal rights. The 
defendants were permitted to appeal to the United States Military Governor.
144
 They 
were given the right to seek clemency and pardons based on firstly, a review of the 
evidence against them, secondly, any legal issues, and thirdly, personal 
circumstances.
145
 While often viewed as political mechanisms, these ‘appellate’ 
procedures benefited a large portion of defendants.
146
  
 
Arguably, the right of appeal was not considered as fundamental in the 1940s, and is 
more vigorously protected by contemporary standards.
147
 Critics accept that it would 
have added complexity to the trials, but that “justice demands it.”
148
 Given that the 
Tribunal permitted trial in abstentia, in conjunction with the ability of the Tribunal to 
award a death sentence,
149
 the fact that the defendants had no right of appeal was 
particularly unjust in these circumstances. The potential partiality and lack of 
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independence of the judges was unable to be mitigated by appeal to a neutral 
authority, or even another legal figure of the Allied nations. While there is no 
knowing whether the convictions or sentences would have been overturned or even 
lessened, the absence of such an opportunity greatly diminishes the chance of the 
Nuremberg trial being judged as just. 
 
VIII Conclusion 
 
The Nuremberg trial at the IMT was the first international tribunal established for the 
punishment of war crimes, and has provided a model for later ad hoc tribunals and the 
more permanent International Criminal Court. While the trial has often been praised 
for laying the foundations for subsequent international criminal tribunals, 
Nuremberg’s adherence to procedural due process can be extensively criticised.  
 
Given the circumstances of the trial and the limited practical alternatives available, 
the Nazi defendants were arguably afforded more due process rights than they could 
have expected. Justice Jackson aptly recognised this at the close of the trial:
150
 
  
The future will never have to ask, with misgiving, what could the Nazis 
have said in their favour. History will know that whatever could be said, 
they were allowed to say. They have been given the kind of a Trial which 
they, in the days of their pomp and power, never gave to any man. 
 
The Tribunal partially protected the defendants’ right to be represented by counsel. 
However, notwithstanding its express protection in the Charter, Hess was directly 
denied the right to act as his own counsel, in breach of this fundamental right. The 
Tribunal protected the defendants’ right to a public hearing by ensuring that all 
hearings were conducted publically.  The Tribunal at Nuremberg was far from 
independent, though due to the efforts of Lord Justice Lawrence, this did not detract 
substantially from its ability to remain impartial. Similarly, the efforts of the judges to 
mitigate the inequalities between the prosecution and the defence are direct evidence 
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of the Tribunal’s determination to secure an equal (and thus fair) trial for the 
defendants. 
 
The grossest breach of the defendants’ due process rights lay in the deprivation of 
adequate time and facilities to prepare and present a defence. The lack of time granted 
to the defendants to prepare a defence, the lack of access to necessary documentary 
evidence, the translation difficulties, abuse of flexible evidentiary rules and 
acceptance of ex parte witness affidavits in conjunction operated to deprive the 
Nuremberg defendants of this fundamental due process right. 
 
The second major breach of due process was the inability of the defendants to appeal 
the judgments and sentences to a higher appellate body. While this right was not 
considered as fundamental in the 1940s, the fact that the Tribunal (whose 
independence can be genuinely questioned) allowed defendants to be tried in 
abstentia, in addition to the ability of the Tribunal to award the death sentence made 
the lack of appellate instance particularly unjust. 
 
The due process rights of the twenty-two defendants were partially protected at 
Nuremberg. The right to represent oneself, the right to properly prepare and present a 
defence and the right of appeal are pivotal due process rights that are recognised and 
protected internationally; however, they were not protected at Nuremberg. These 
gross breaches of fundamental due process rights operated to compromise the 
integrity of the trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The word count of this paper (not including cover page, contents, abstract, bibliography and non-
substantive footnotes) is 7,989. 
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